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CULTURAL REPLICATION AND MICROBIAL 
EVOLUTION 
Bence Nanay
The aim of this paper is to argue that cultural evolution is in many ways much more simi-
lar to microbial than to macrobial biological evolution. As a result, we are better off using 
microbial evolution as the model of cultural evolution. And this shift from macrobial to mi-
crobial entails adjusting the theoretical models we can use for explaining cultural evolution. 
Introduction
We have a very elegant and effi cient theory for explaining certain biological changes from 
population to population: the theory of natural selection. The theory of natural selection 
has a remarkable explanatory power: it can explain something very complex, such as the 
structure of the human eye or the fi t between the organism and the environment in terms of 
something very simple, the dumb causal processes of births and deaths. A tempting idea is 
that the same explanatory scheme could be used to explain some complex non-biological, 
more precisely, cultural phenomena (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Sterelny 2006a; Lumsden 
and Wilson 1981; Hull 1988, 2001; Fracchia and Lewontin 1999; Dawkins 1976, 1982a, 
1983; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Aunger 2000; Dennett 1995; Campbell 1956, 
1960, 1974; Toulmin 1967, 1970, 1972; Kantorovich 1989; Bradie 1986; Popper 1963, 
1972, 1974, 1978; Nanay 2011b – the list is obviously far from being complete). This is 
exactly what theories of cultural evolution attempt to do. 
There are numerous important differences between biological and cultural evolution. The 
question is whether the explanatory scheme of the theory of natural selection could be ap-
plied in the cultural domain in spite of these dissimilarities.
In this paper, I want to focus on three salient differences between biological and cultural 
evolution:
1)  Cultural evolution is very fast, much faster than biological evolution. 
2)  In the case of biological evolution, information transmission is vertical: we inherit our 
genes from two individuals only (our parents). This is not true for cultural evolution, 
where information is also transmitted laterally, from peers to peers. 
3)  The fi delity of information transmission in the case of biological evolution is much 
higher than in the cultural case. 
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There are many more widely discussed differences: it has been claimed that cultural evo-
lution is Lamarckian, whereas biological evolution is Weismannian, etc. (Hull 1980, 1981). 
But I will focus on (1), (2), and (3) here. 
The aim of this paper is to argue that when it comes to (1), (2), and (3), cultural evolution 
is much more similar to microbial than to macrobial biological evolution. As a result, we are 
better off using microbial evolution as the model of cultural evolution. And this shift from 
macrobial to microbial entails adjusting the theoretical models we can use for describing 
cultural evolution.
Macrobial versus microbial evolution as a model for cultural 
evolution
Here is an odd fact about the literature on cultural evolution. It invariably takes macrobial 
evolution to be the model of cultural evolution. When it compares the biological and the 
cultural domain, it really compares the domain of macrobial biology and culture.
But macrobes are not the only biological entities – in fact, they are not even the most 
widespread ones. Evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology have been actively 
ignoring microbes, and this, arguably, has been a mistake. We may be able to understand 
important facts about biological evolution if we understand the microbial world (see, for 
example, O’Malley and Dupré’s 2007 manifesto). And my proposal in this paper is that we 
may be able to understand something important about cultural evolution if we take micro-
bial evolution, and not macrobial evolution, as its model. 
1)  Microbial evolution is in many respects very different from macrobial evolution. Here 
are three important (and conspicuously numbered) differences: 
 Microbial evolution is very fast, much faster than macrobial evolution (see e.g., Law-
rence 2002). 
2)  In the case of macrobial evolution, information transmission is vertical: we inherit 
our genes from one or two individuals (the parent[s]). This is not true for microbial 
evolution, where information is also transmitted laterally – this is called lateral gene 
transfer, where the transfer of genetic material from one organism to another happens 
by conjugation, transduction, or transformation (Bushman 2002; Thomas and Nielsen 
2005; see O’Malley and Dupré 2007: 167–168 especially for a philosophical analysis 
of this phenomenon).
3)  The fi delity of information transmission in the case of macrobial evolution is much 
higher than in the microbial case (see e.g., Lawrence 2002; O’Malley and Dupré 
2007). 
In other words, the three differences I considered in the last section between biological 
and cultural evolution were in fact differences between macrobial and cultural evolution. 
And we fi nd the exact same differences between macrobial and microbial evolution. The 
conclusion is that we would be much better off using microbial evolution for modeling 
cultural evolution. 
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The aim of this paper is to cash out what this shift of emphasis from macrobial to micro-
bial evolution in the analysis of cultural evolution would entail in terms of the theoretical 
framework we can use to model cultural evolution. 
Two ways of thinking about natural selection
There are two distinct ways of conceiving of selection processes. According to one, selec-
tion is the heritable variation of fi tness. According to the other, it consists of repeated cycles 
of replication and interaction. These two models of selection75 give us very different ways of 
formulating evolutionary explanations, and they even yield different kinds of evolutionary 
explanations. 
According to the fi rst model (Lewontin 1970; Maynard Smith 1987), selection should be 
described as the heritable variation of fi tness. A typical formulation is the following (see also 
Lewontin 1970: 1; Endler 1986: 4; Ridley 1996: 71–72; Godfrey-Smith 2007: 515).
A suffi cient mechanism for evolution by natural selection is contained in three proposi-
tions:
1)  There is variation in morphological, physiological, or behavioral traits among mem-
bers of a species (the principle of variation).
2)  The variation is in part heritable, so individuals resemble their relations more than 
they resemble unrelated individuals, and, in particular, offspring resemble their par-
ents (the principle of heredity).
3)  Different variants leave different numbers of offspring either in immediate or remote 
generations (the principle of differential fi tness). (Lewontin 1980: 76).76
According to the alternative concept, selection consists in repeated cycles of two separate 
processes. As Ernst Mayr says, “natural selection is actually a two-step process, the fi rst 
one consisting of the production of genetically different individuals (variation), while the 
survival and reproductive success of these individuals is determined in the second step, the 
actual selection process” (Mayr 1991: 68; see also Mayr 1982: 519–520; Mayr 2001: 117; 
Mayr 1978). David Hull calls these two steps replication and interaction (Hull 1981; Hull 
1988; Hull et al. 2001). Hull defi nes selection as “[t]he repeated cycles of replication and 
environmental interaction so structured that environmental interaction causes replication to 
be differential” (Hull et al. 2001: 53).
In turn, Hull (1988: 408) defi nes the unit of replication, the replicator, as “an entity that 
passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications” (see Hull 1980: 318 for a 
slightly different defi nition). The unit of interaction, the interactor, on the other hand, is de-
75 I will refer to these two ways of conceiving of selection as two models of selection, acknowledging that my 
use of the concept of models is different from the way this term is used in biology. 
76 According to Lewontin (1980: 76), each of these three propositions is necessary for evolution by natural 
selection (besides being jointly suffi cient). 
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fi ned as the “entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that 
this interaction causes replication to be differential” (Hull 1988: 408; see Hull 1980: 318). 
This replication–interaction model of selection was introduced as an improvement on 
the heritable variation of fi tness model, and it is supposed to clarify a number of details left 
implicit therein. More precisely, the replication–interaction model has been thought to help 
us to understand what is at stake in the units of selection debate: if selection is replication 
plus interaction, then we should not talk about the units of selection, but rather about the 
units of replication and the units of interaction, which may not be (and in fact most often 
are not) the same. The thought is that the replication–interaction distinction in itself will not 
solve this problem, but it is supposed to help us to formulate the problem in such a way that 
would make it possible to tackle it (see e.g., Lewontin 1970: 7; Brandon 1982, 1988, 2006; 
and especially Lloyd 2001). 
 In the last decade or so, more and more evolutionary biologists and philosophers of 
biology have been arguing against the replication–interaction model. Their main claim is 
that replication is not necessary for evolution by natural selection, or, as I will put briefl y, 
for selection.77 As a result, the heritable variation of fi tness model has become more and 
more widely used. 
In the cultural evolution literature, both of these models are used. The most famous, but 
not the only, example of the replication–interaction model in the domain of cultural evolu-
tion is meme theory. These two models are also often applied to the cultural domain without 
a clear attempt to distinguish the two – as in Richerson and Boyd (2005: Chapter 3), where 
the fi rst half of the chapter uses the heritable variation of fi tness model, whereas the second 
half uses a version of the replication–interaction model, without any explicit acknowledge-
ment of the difference between the two. 
My aim is to point out that regardless of whether the heritable variation of fi tness model 
or the replication–interaction model is better suited for describing macrobial evolution, the 
heritable variation of fi tness model faces serious problems when applied to microbial evolu-
tion. And it faces the same problems when applied to cultural evolution. In other words, we 
are better off using the replication–interaction model for describing microbial and cultural 
evolution. 
The heritable variation of fi tness and microbial evolution
The heritable variation of fi tness model may look straightforward, but in fact it is not. 
What this account of selection entails very much depends on the way in which we interpret 
the concept of fi tness. And there is no agreement on a number of important features of this 
concept. 
77 There is an important terminological difference in the way the concept of selection is being used in the 
literature. Some ask whether replication is necessary for evolution by natural selection (Okasha 2007; Godfrey-
Smith 2007), others ask whether replication is necessary for selection itself (Hull 1988; Neander 1995; Hull 2001; 
Nanay 2005). I assume that these are two different ways of asking the same question (the question of whether 
replication is necessary for evolution by natural selection) and I will use the latter formulation because it is sim-
pler. If the reader prefers the former one, he/she should read ‘evolution by natural selection’ instead of ‘selection’ 
in what follows. 
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Is fi tness a causal or a statistical concept (Matthen and Ariew 2002)? Is it a population-
level or an individual-level concept (Millstein 2006)? What entity do we attribute fi tness 
to, individuals or to trait types (Sober 1981; see also Nanay 2010b; Nanay 2011c)? If the 
former, is an individual’s fi tness the same throughout its life (Ramsey 2006)? If the latter, 
how should we individuate these trait types (Nanay 2010a)? 
The two most infl uential questions about fi tness and about selection are whether they 
should be taken to be population-level or individual-level phenomena, and whether they are 
causal or statistical concepts (Matthen and Ariew 2002; Walsh et al. 2002; Millstein 2006; 
Brandon 2006; Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004; Rosenberg and Bouchard 2005; Stephens 
2004). It has been pointed out that the concept of fi tness is used in two different ways: as an 
“ecological descriptor” and as a “mathematical predictor” (Sober 2001: 319; this distinction 
may be traced back to Kitcher 1984: 50). Building on Sober’s distinction, Mohan Matthen 
and André Ariew (2002) made a distinction between “vernacular” and “predictive” fi tness.78 
Vernacular fi tness is a measure of the “overall competitive advantage traceable to herit-
able traits” (Matthen and Ariew 2002: 56). Predictive fi tness, in contrast, is the “expected 
rate of increase (normalized relative to others) of a gene, a trait, or an organism’s repre-
sentation in future generations” (Matthen and Ariew 2002: 56). Vernacular fi tness plays 
a role in the informal presentations of natural selection, whereas predictive fi tness is used 
in mathematical formulations of population genetics. Vernacular fi tness is a comparative 
measure, whereas predictive fi tness is a quantitative one. Vernacular fi tness is usually taken 
to be a cause of selection, whereas predictive fi tness is taken to be a measure of selection, 
not its cause. 
Matthen and Ariew (2002) argue that we should only use the concept of predictive fi t-
ness. Others defend the concept of vernacular fi tness and insist that it is an individual-level 
concept (Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004; Rosenberg and Bouchard 2005). Yet another group 
of philosophers concede that it is a population-level concept, but maintain that it is a causal 
one (Stephens 2004; Millstein 2006). There are some further questions about fi tness. Is it 
fi xed throughout the organism’s lifetime (Ramsey 2006)? In what way does it depend on the 
environment and how can we characterize the environment it depends on (Abrams 2007)? 
 Before we get entangled in the Byzantine debates surrounding the concept of fi tness, we 
should take a step back and ask: why should we conceive of selection as the heritable varia-
tion of fi tness at all? There are important cases of natural selection where it is not clear how 
the heritable variation of fi tness account could even be formulated.79 
An important aspect of the heritable variation of fi tness account is that it talks about par-
ents and offspring. Both what Lewontin calls “the principle of variation” and what he calls 
“the principle of differential fi tness” (Lewontin 1980: 76) are principles about the parent–
offspring relation. But there are cases of natural selection where it is unclear what should be 
considered as the parent and what should be considered as the offspring. Here are two such 
78 Ariew and Lewontin (2004) refer to these two concepts of fi tness as “Darwinian” and “reproductive” fi t-
ness.
79 I leave aside some further potential problems with the heritable variation of the fi tness account, for example, 
that it presupposes that the parent and offspring generations do not overlap (see Ariew and Lewontin 2004). I 
assume that the heritable variation of the fi tness account could be modifi ed in such a way that it could deal with 
this potential problem. 
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cases: selection among clonal organisms and in the microbial world. For the purposes of this 
paper, I will focus on microbial evolution (but see Nanay 2011a on clonal selection). It is 
important to note that these are not marginal cases of natural selection (on how widespread 
and important clonal reproduction is, see Godfrey-Smith 2009: 71–72, and Bouchard 2008; 
on the importance and relevance of the microbial world, see O’Malley and Dupré 2007’s 
manifesto). 
As we have seen, a striking feature of most microbial population is lateral gene transfer, 
the transfer of genetic material from one organism to another by conjugation, transduction, 
or transformation (Bushman 2002; Thomas and Nielsen 2005; see O’Malley and Dupré 
2007: 167–168 especially for a philosophical analysis of this phenomenon). Lateral gene 
transfer makes natural selection (and evolutionary change in general) in the microbial world 
more rapid and more frequent than it is among macrobes (see e.g., Lawrence 2002). 
But how can we talk about the heritable variation of fi tness in the case of lateral gene 
transfer? Lateral gene transfer is not from parent to offspring. It is from offspring to off-
spring. This, again, makes it diffi cult to even formulate the principle of variation and the 
principle of differential fi tness of the heritable variation of fi tness account (see O’Malley 
and Dupré 2007 for a summary of how lateral gene transfer in the microbial world chal-
lenges our existing evolutionary accounts). 
 Could we not defend the heritable variation of fi tness account by arguing that lateral 
gene transfer should be considered a simple mutation from the point of view of the organ-
ism that is on the receiving end of the transfer? This move is indeed open to the proponents 
of the heritable variation of fi tness account, but it is diffi cult to see how it will help. Lateral 
gene transfer can have varying degrees of fi delity. Thus, it can, in principle, give rise to 
bona fi de evolution by natural selection that may even lead to adaptation. But lateral gene 
transfer is (by defi nition) not an intergenerational change. And this makes it impossible to 
talk about the change of fi tness values, as fi tness is defi ned with reference to (some features 
of) the parent generation and (some features of) the offspring generation. When lateral gene 
transfer gives rise to evolution by natural selection, this cannot be described with the help of 
the heritable variation of fi tness account. 
It seems then that, while the heritable variation of fi tness account may or may not be the 
right model for macrobial evolution, it is unlikely to be the right way to describe microbial 
evolution. But, because of the structural similarities between microbial and cultural evolu-
tion, it is also unlikely to be the right way to describe cultural evolution. The argument I 
gave in the last couple of paragraphs can be easily rephrased with regards to horizontal 
information transfer in the case of the cultural domain. If we want to understand cultural 
evolution (and microbial evolution), we are well advised not to use the heritable variation of 
fi tness account. We should turn to the replication–interaction model. 
The replication–interaction model and microbial evolution
The replication–interaction account of selection is a genuine alternative to the heritable 
variation of fi tness account, but it has different versions and the most widespread of these 
is widely assumed to be highly problematic. We can distinguish two versions of this ac-
count, the replicator–interactor account and the property-replication account. The former 
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has been repeatedly criticized. I argue that we should use the latter when modeling microbial 
and cultural evolution. 
The replicator–interactor account
According to the fi rst version of the replication–interaction account, replication is the cop-
ying of an entity, the replicator. Hull defi nes the replicator as “an entity that passes on its 
structure largely intact in successive replications” (Hull 1988: 408; see also Godfrey-Smith 
2000; Brandon 1990; see Nanay 2002 on the concept of replicator). The unit of interac-
tion, the interactor, on the other hand, is defi ned as the “entity that interacts as a cohesive 
whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be dif-
ferential” (Hull 1988: 408). I will call this version of the property-replication account 
the replicator–interactor account as it identifi es replication with the copying of an entity, 
the replicator. 
In the last decade or so, many philosophers and biologists have argued against this repli-
cator–interactor account of selection (Okasha 2007: 15–16; Godfrey-Smith 2007: 515; God-
frey-Smith 2009; Avital and Jablonka 2000: 359; Jablonka and Lamb 1995; Richerson and 
Boyd 2005: Chapter 3; Griesemer 2000: 74–76; Griesemer 2002: 105). Their main claim is 
that the copying of replicators is not necessary for selection; hence, selection cannot consist 
of repeated cycles of replication (conceived of as the copying of replicators) and interaction. 
There are ways of transmitting information (for example, extragenetic inheritance) that 
do not count as replication but that are (given other conditions) suffi cient for selection (Oka-
sha 2007: 15; Avital and Jablonka 2000: 359; Jablonka and Lamb 1995: 3). Samir Okasha 
summarizes this line of objection: “evolutionary changes mediated by cultural and behav-
ioural inheritance cannot be described as the differential transmission of replicators” (Oka-
sha 2007: 15). To put this objection in more general terms, selection can happen if there 
is suffi cient phenotypic parent–offspring resemblance. Replication is not needed (Okasha 
2007: 15). One example is maternal effects, i.e., cases in which large mothers have large 
offspring as a result of laying eggs with larger food reserves (Uller 2008). 
The property-replication account
It is important that these problems are problems for the replicator–interactor account and 
not for the replication–interaction account in general. Remember that the original alternative 
to the heritable variation of fi tness account was the view that selection consists of repeated 
cycles of replication and interaction. It is an additional requirement that replication should 
be thought of as the copying of an entity, namely, the replicator. 
We may be able to salvage the general gist of the replication–interaction account if we 
deny that replication is the copying of an entity. We could conceive of replication as the cop-
ying of property-instances (Nanay 2011a; see also Nanay 2002: 113). The hope is that this 
version is not vulnerable to the objections raised against the replicator–interactor account. I 
will use the term property-replication account for this version of the original replication–in-
teraction account to contrast it with the replicator–interactor account. 
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It is important to clarify the difference between these two versions, i.e., what is meant by 
entities and properties here. The cup in front of me is an entity. It has lots of properties, some 
interesting, some others less so. Its color is one property, its shape is another one, etc. Thus, 
the copying of an entity and the copying of one of the properties of this entity are very dif-
ferent processes. Properties are always properties of entities, of course. But it is possible to 
copy a property of an entity without thereby copying the entity itself. The claim is that rep-
lication is the copying of properties: we can have a replication process without there being 
a replicator that is being copied.80 The defi nition of replication would then be the following 
(Nanay 2011a: Section 4): property P of object (a) is a replica of property Q of object (b) if 
and only if: (1) P is similar to Q and (2) Q is causally involved in the production of P in a 
way responsible for the similarity of P to Q. 
An important feature of this defi nition is that (a) and (b) are not necessarily objects of the 
same kind. Object (b) may be an apple, and object (a) a color photograph of this apple. The 
color of the photograph can be a replica of the color of the apple under my defi nition, but 
this does not mean that the objects themselves are replicas or copies or replicators in the old 
sense of the word. 
This notion of replication is very weak: many non-biological copying processes, like 
photocopying, will also qualify as replication. Is this a problem? No. The same is true of the 
traditional concept of replication as the copying of replicators (Godfrey-Smith 2000; Nanay 
2002). Importantly, any account that conceives of selection as the repeated cycles of replica-
tion and interaction needs to acknowledge that not every replication process will be particu-
larly interesting from an evolutionary point of view. But this is what we should expect: the 
notion of replication is only the starting point for an account of selection. Further additional 
criteria need to be met in order for replication to lead to selection: replication needs to give 
rise to an interaction process that makes the next round of replication differential. 
How can this property-replication account handle the objections to the replicator–inter-
actor account? First, according to the property-replication account, both extragenetic in-
heritance and cultural transmission can count as replication. Nothing in the defi nition of 
replication suggests that the replicated property needs to be a property of the DNA. Thus, 
extragenetic properties can replicate as much as the properties of the DNA can. If property 
P of the offspring is similar to property Q of the parent, and the latter is causally responsible 
for this similarity, then we do have replication, regardless of whether these properties can 
be called genotypic or not. 
Crucially, the transfer of cultural information also counts as replication if we understand 
replication in the way that property-replication suggests: cultural properties are being rep-
licated. Remember that the defi nition of replication was the following: property P of object 
(a) is a replica of property Q of object (b) if and only if: (1) P is similar to Q and (2) Q is 
causally involved in the production of P in a way responsible for the similarity of P to Q. As 
P and Q can be any property in this defi nition, cultural information transfer would qualify as 
replication, as long as both (1) and (2) are satisfi ed. 
80 Biologists call the properties of organisms ‘traits.’ If someone prefers this concept to the concept of pro-
perties, he/she can rephrase my defi nition of replication as ‘the copying of traits.’ But as the replicated properties 
are not necessarily properties of an organism, I will talk about properties, rather than traits, in what follows in or-
der to preserve generality.
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More generally, if we accept the property-replication account, then phenotypic traits can 
replicate. Take the maternal effects example I mentioned in the last subsection. According to 
the property-replication account, there is a property that replicates in this case: the property 
of being large. The offspring’s instantiation of this property is similar to her mother’s (in 
as much as the degree of similarity between the size of the two individuals is higher than it 
is between the size of two randomly chosen individuals in the population), and her size is 
causally responsible for this similarity. Thus, we do have selection in this population, but we 
also have replication. We do not have replicators though. 
Property-replication and lateral gene transfer
So far, everything looks promising: the property-replication account is not susceptible to the 
objections that were raised against the replicator–interactor account. But the real question is 
whether the property-replication account is a genuine alternative to the heritable variation 
of fi tness account. More precisely, can it handle the cases of selection in the microbial world 
that were problematic for the heritable variation of fi tness account?
If we accept the property-replication account, then microbial evolution will pose no prob-
lem as lateral gene transfer will count as a replication process. Lateral gene transfer is the 
copying of an entity (and its many property-instances) from one organism to the other. And 
this counts as replication under any account of replication: both the replication–interaction 
conception and the property-replication conception. Some replication processes will happen 
from parent to offspring, some others from offspring to offspring. 
If either kind of replication processes gives rise to environmental interaction that makes 
the next round of replication (again, either parent to offspring, or offspring to offspring 
replication) differential, we have a selection process, conceived as the repeated cycles of 
replication and interaction. We can talk about selection in microbial populations without 
running into the problems that the concept of fi tness poses in this context. 
And the same goes for horizontal information transfer in the case of cultural evolution: 
it counts as replication in the sense that the property-replication view uses the term. Some 
replication processes will happen from parent to offspring, some others from offspring to 
offspring. If either kind of replication processes gives rise to environmental interaction that 
makes the next round of replication (again, either parent to offspring, or offspring to off-
spring replication) differential, we have a selection process, conceived as the repeated cy-
cles of replication and interaction. 
We then get the following picture: there are three ways of modeling natural selection, 
the heritable variation of fi tness account, and two versions of the replication–interaction 
account, the replicator–interactor account and the property-replication account. We have 
seen that the heritable variation of fi tness account is unlikely to be able to be the right way 
to think about cultural and microbial evolution because it cannot handle lateral gene transfer 
and horizontal information transfer. The replicator–interactor account has been facing vari-
ous objections. The best bet for those who want to understand cultural and microbial evolu-
tion is then the property-replication account. 
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Property-replication and cultural evolution: Cultural replication 
without memes 
As the most famous account of applying the replication–interaction model to cultural evo-
lution is meme theory, one may worry that the shift from the heritable variation of fi tness 
model to the replication–interaction model I am encouraging in the context of cultural evo-
lution would amount to a return to meme theory. 
Much of the recent discussion of cultural evolution has been revolving around the con-
cept of meme. The distinction between replicator and interactor was originally famously 
introduced “as a generalization of the traditional genotype–phenotype distinction” (Brandon 
1990: 125). This means that there can be, and supposedly there are, entities other than the 
gene that would count as replicators. The main candidates for such replicators have been 
memes. 
Memes are defi ned as the “units of the cultural transmission” (Dawkins 1976/1989: 192; 
see also Dawkins 1982a, 1982b). According to meme theory, cultural phenomena can be 
explained, at least partially, with the help of the following evolutionary model: memes are 
pieces of information, and they compete for survival in a way quite similar to genes; the dif-
ference is that they compete for the capacity of our minds. A meme can be a tune, the idea 
of liberalism, or the habit of brushing one’s teeth. Those tunes will survive that can get into 
and stay in many minds. The ones that fail to do so will die out. Meme theory is clearly a 
way of applying the replicator–interactor model to the cultural domain. 
 Meme theory is still extremely popular (see Blackmore 1999; Dennett 2003, 2006; 
Aunger 2002; Distin 2005), but it has been severely criticized for various reasons, partly for 
worries about the ontological status of memes (Sperber 1996; Wimsatt 1999; Fracchia and 
Lewontin 1999; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Sterelny 2006a, 2006b). What are these cultural 
replicators supposed to be? 
There have been various attempts to answer this question (Dennett 2006: 80–81, and 
349–350; Dennett 2003; Aunger 2002: 311–322; Distin 2005). An infl uential strategy is to 
say that both genes and memes are really just pieces of information, and there is nothing 
ontologically worrying about the concept of information (this is Dennett’s and Distin’s re-
sponse; but see Aunger’s more restrictive version). Note that this view violates the concept 
of replicator the original replication–interaction model was presupposing.81 
It is important to note that meme theory applies the replicator–interactor model to cultural 
evolution. My proposal, in contrast, has been that we should apply the property-replication 
model instead. If we do so, we can bypass the ontological worries meme theory faces. This 
move would replace the notion of cultural replicators, that is, memes, with replicated cul-
tural properties. 
It has been argued that whether or not we buy into meme theory, there are processes in 
the cultural domain that can be described as replication (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Sterelny 
81 They are not reproducers either: a meme and its copy do not have any material overlap.
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2006a, 2006b).82 If we accept my defi nition of replication, then we can explain these proc-
esses without postulating ontologically suspicious entities, like memes.83 
It is important to note that if we acknowledge that there are processes that could count as 
cultural replication, we do not need to be thereby committed to allow for cultural selection 
(as replication is not suffi cient for selection), let alone cumulative cultural selection that 
could explain why certain cultural features are the way they are. If we accept my defi nition 
of replication, this will not salvage meme theory, or even the very idea of memes. But it 
would make it possible to talk about cultural replication, without specifying what the repli-
cated entities would be, or without positing the existence of memes.
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to argue that we should use microbial, rather than macro-
bial evolution as the model for understanding cultural evolution. And the emphasis on the 
similarities between microbial and cultural evolution as well as on the differences between 
microbial and cultural evolution should persuade us to abandon both the heritable variation 
of fi tness model and the replicator–interactor model when it comes to understanding cultural 
evolution, and use the property-replication view instead. 
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